

Many thanks to Matt for his thoughtful and detailed comments! I'll first address Matt's main point. Matt points to an important phenomenon of perceptual experience: phenomenological particularity. When we see, say, a red apple hanging from a tree, we aren't just aware that there is a red apple. We are aware of a particular red apple. More generally, when we perceive, our sensory state is of external, mind-independent particulars. Now, a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination will exhibit the very same phenomenological particularity. When we hallucinate a red apple hanging from a tree, it will seem to us that there is a particular apple hanging from a tree. If this weren't the case, the hallucination wouldn't be subjectively indistinguishable from a perception. Matt is right that I don't address the issue in this paper. (My paper "The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience" (2010) is devoted to this issue.)

Matt suggests that in order to account for the phenomenon of phenomenological particularity, we need to say that hallucinating subjects stand in an awareness relation to some peculiar entity, such as a sense datum. I certainly see the temptation to say that we stand in an awareness relation to a peculiar entity, be it a strange particular, such as, a sense-datum, a quale, or an intentional object, or an abstract entity, such as a property or a property-cluster. However, I disagree that we need to invoke awareness relations to peculiar entities to account for the sensory states of hallucination. Indeed, one of the motivations of understanding sensory states in terms of employing perceptual capacities is to avoid having to invoke awareness relations to peculiar entities.

Matt asks how my capacity-view accounts for the phenomenological particularity of hallucinations? In response: I argue that hallucinating subjects employ perceptual capacities that purport to single out particulars (albeit failing to single out the relevant particulars). Employing perceptual capacities accounts for the intentional directedness to a seeming particular object and the properties that this object instantiates and so accounts for the phenomenological particularity. But there is no need to

think that employing such capacities entails the existence of the objects and property-instances that the capacities purport to pick out.

Why is this a better approach than appealing to awareness relations to peculiar entities? Much ink has been spilled attacking sense-datum views and few people hold this view these days. So I'll focus on the view that sensory states should be understood in terms of (awareness relations to) properties, since this is a popular view these days. Properties are abstract entities. Abstract entities are not causally efficacious and are not spatio-temporally located. It's unclear what it would be to be sensorily aware of something that is not spatio-temporally located and not causally efficacious. To be sure, I don't think it's a problem to be cognitively aware of abstract entities. But presumably we want something more than cognitive awareness to account for the sensory state of hallucinations.

I'm going to post this to get the discussion started and will follow up with responses to Matt's questions of detail in a bit.