

Here are responses to Matt's questions of detail. Thanks again to Matt for thinking through my paper so carefully!

First, Matt asks about the argument for the metaphysical priority of the good over the bad case and in particular, "why must it... be true that I can employ [a perceptual capacity] in a bad case only because I can employ it in a good case?" In response: I cannot employ a perceptual capacity in hallucination, if I don't possess the relevant perceptual capacity. I don't count as possessing a perceptual capacity, if I could not employ the capacity in the good case. After all, it's unclear what it would be to possess the capacity to discriminate, say, red from other colors and single out red in our environment, if we were not in a position to discriminate red from other colors and single out red in our environment, were I perceptually related to red. This is a minimal condition on possessing a perceptual capacity. Now it might be that we're always unlucky and are never in fact perceptually related to red things and so never in a position to single out red things in our environment. But the minimal condition still holds.

Second, Matt asks how to understand the relevant perceptual capacities so that they are identical in the good and the bad cases and he points to the fact that there are certain capacities (e.g. focusing of the lens) in play in perception that are not in play in hallucination. In response: consider what happens when we employ a concept but fail to refer. On standard views of concepts it's unproblematic to say that we employ the very same concept in the good and the bad case. The difference between the two cases is only that in the one case we refer and in the other we fail to refer. The very same thing can be said of perceptual capacities. Now, Matt is right that all sorts of capacities are in play in perception that are not in play in hallucination, for instance focusing of the lens. The point can be strengthened: there are all sorts of

capacities involved in experience that have no repercussions for sensory states and no repercussions for the epistemic force of experience. In response: I'm not arguing that all capacities employed in perception have repercussion for our sensory states and the epistemic force of experience. I'm asking what it is about sensory states that makes them rational heed and then saying that they are determined by employing perceptual capacities, which in turn have certain properties. It doesn't follow from this that all capacities employed in perception determine sensory states. Similarly, it doesn't follow from this that all capacities employed in hallucination determine sensory states.

BIVs can possess perceptual capacities and can employ them in hallucination. After all if they were in the good case, they would be in a position to single out what the perceptual capacity functions to single out. Now granted it's hard for a BIV to be in the good case: it would have to be connected to sensory organs for a start. But the fact that it's hard for a BIV to be in the good case, doesn't change anything about the argument.

Third, Matt asks whether perceptual capacities are object-dependent? There are at least three different ways of understanding this question and my response is different depending on which way the question is meant.

1. One way of understanding it is as a question about possessing capacities: could a subject possess perceptual capacity, even though she has never been perceptually related to a particular of the kind that the capacity functions to single out? In response: yes. After all, the capacities could be innate and she may have been unlucky and never been perceptually related to the relevant capacities. Alternatively, she may have acquired the capacity through testimony or imagination.
2. Another way of understanding it is as an existence question: could a perceptual capacity exist that functions to single out a kind of particular that does not exist in our world, such as supersaturated red? In response: given what I see in the paper that is possible. But for empiricist reasons

independent of the paper, one might think perceptual capacities must be grounded in perception, in the sense that any given perceptual capacity must have been used by someone somewhere. On such a view, hallucinations of supersaturated red need to be analyzed in terms employing the capacity to single out instances of red and the capacity to single out instances of supersaturatedness. But as I said, what I say in the paper is neutral on this issue.

3. A third way of understanding the question is as a question about employing capacities: could a perceptual capacity be employed even if the relevant particular is not present? In response: yes. After all, the very same perceptual capacity can be employed in hallucination and in perception.